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*The art of remote personality assessment
pays off at the highest level*

PERSONALITY PROFILES IN SUPPORT OF THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT

Jerrold Post, M.D.

Among the briefing materials President Carter carried to Camp David for his historic meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in September 1978 were a personality profile on each of the two Middle Eastern leaders and a third profile comparing their personalities and negotiating style. Following his diplomatic triumph, the President conveyed his appreciation to the Central Intelligence Agency for the intelligence support provided him and singled out the personality profiles for special praise: "After spending 13 days with the two principals," he said, "I wouldn't change a word."

The history of studies relating personality and political behavior predates the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency, but controversy over the validity of such studies is as strong today as when Walter Langer and his associates probed the psyche of Adolf Hitler for the OSS. Much of the current controversy is over causality: was a particular political occurrence caused by a leader's psyche, or did it result from the action of political, historical and cultural forces? This, I submit, is an unnecessary focus of contention, for we believe, along with most historians, that most leadership decisions are multiply determined, and it is when a leader's psychological and political needs are congruent that there is a particularly strong drive toward action. Even the most diehard critic would probably agree that if there is any occasion on which personality features weigh heavily in political proceedings, it is during unstructured negotiations among world leaders from different cultures with different perceptions, values, attitudes and styles. Such was the case at Camp David.

On a visit to the Agency in August 1978, President Carter interrupted a briefing to ask the assembled analysts and intelligence production managers how they could help him before the forthcoming summit meeting, which had only recently been announced. He particularly indicated that he wanted to be "steeped in the personalities of Begin and Sadat."

The presidential request sent a spasm through the National Foreign Assessment Center. The Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) was tasked with preparing political profiles which emphasized the political perspectives of the two main actors; the Office of Central Reference (OCR) was tasked with preparing updated biographic profiles which emphasized personality features; and the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (CAPPB) in the Office of Scientific Intelligence was tasked with updating the studies of the personality and political behavior of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin which had been produced in 1977.

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SECRET**Personality Profiles**

In short order, the several components produced the required material. CAPPB's contribution consisted of three pieces: an updated personality profile of Begin, which called attention to the increasing trend of oppositionism and rigidity in his personality; an updated profile of Sadat entitled "Sadat's Nobel Prize Complex," which stressed his increasing preoccupation with his role in history and the leverage this could provide in negotiations; and a paper which discussed the implications for negotiations of the contrasting intellectual styles of Begin and Sadat. To eliminate redundancy, the OCR and CAPPB profiles were integrated, emphasizing personality features of the leaders apt to become of particular significance during the negotiations. The two integrated personality profiles and the discussion of Begin's and Sadat's contrasting intellectual styles were the personality materials forwarded to support the Camp David negotiations.

It is important to emphasize that the ability of all components to respond effectively in the brief time available rested upon a foundation of significant background research as well as continuing monitoring of the target leaders. In the balance of this discussion, some of the research efforts employed to clarify the personality and political behavior of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin will be described.

A recurring difficulty in analyzing the personality of world leaders is that the necessary data, although ultimately obtainable, has not been systematically recorded. Requests for "instant magic" are not uncommon when a coup, assassination—or in more civilized countries, election—leads to a change of leadership. In order to anticipate the needs of the intelligence community, over the years CAPPB has regularly surveyed key intelligence consumers to identify leaders of special interest, including emerging leaders, and establish research priorities. In developing this priority list, State/INR, Defense/ISA, the National Security Council, and the National Intelligence Officers are surveyed. Parenthetically, these survey results have always impressed the authors with the vigorous diversity of interests among the key consumers. Indeed, prior to the survey of the summer of 1976 no single highest priority candidate had ever been unanimously identified by all components. But that survey revealed across-the-board highest priority interest in one world leader, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt.

In developing personality studies several kinds of data are reviewed. In addition to drawing on all classified reporting, a thorough review of the open literature is conducted. Official and unofficial biographies have often provided key background material and insights, as have television, newspaper and magazine profiles. When there are significant holes in the data, requirements are sent to the field to attempt to develop the missing information. But the data which is particularly rich and especially helpful in developing a solid feeling for the complexities of the personality of a leader is derived from debriefings of senior government and military officials and individuals from the private sector who have had significant personal contact with the object of the study. Official reporting has often been so heavily slanted toward current political concerns that a wealth of astute observations concerning perceptions, attitudes, and negotiating styles of the actors has never been recorded. These perceptions and observations can be lost during the transition from one administration to another, especially if the observations were made during the course of extremely sensitive negotiations, the details of which were necessarily closely held.

The strategic importance of the Middle East, the relative imperviousness of the Near Eastern mind to Western perceptions, and the highly personalized leadership styles of its rulers have had the effect of focusing a disproportionate share of CAPPB's efforts on the personalities of Near Eastern leaders. In the process of developing studies of such leaders as King Hussein of Jordan, Yitzak Rabin of Israel, and Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, we had regularly debriefed key officials whose concern was the Middle East, including participants in the shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. So when we began research for our study of Sadat in the winter of 1977, we had some material already on hand and were able to reinterview those who had had significant contact with Sadat.

Several themes emerged as we collated interview impressions. Sadat's concern with his role in history and his preoccupation with "the big picture," coupled with his abhorrence of details, were regularly mentioned. By appealing to Sadat's long-range goals, Secretary Kissinger was often able to overcome negotiating impasses over technical details.

Ambassador Elts related one amusing and charming anecdote which epitomized this quality. The occasion was a luncheon hosted by President Sadat just after a breakthrough in negotiations. Present were President Sadat, Madame Sadat, Secretary of State Kissinger, and Ambassador Elts. "Your Excellency," said Secretary Kissinger, raising his glass, "without your broad vision of history and your refusal to be bogged down by petty detail, we never could have come to this day." "No, Henry," replied President Sadat, "it was your negotiating skill which brought us to this day." "Oh no, Your Excellency," replied Kissinger, "it was your ability to think in strategic terms that . . ." At this point, Madame Sadat interrupted with a loud sigh to Ambassador Elts, "Oh no, here we go again."

A major conclusion of this study addressed the manner in which Sadat's special view of himself and this "big picture mentality" interacted. "Sadat's self-confidence and special view of himself has been instrumental in development of his innovative foreign policy, as have his flexibility and his capacity for moving out of the cultural insularity of the Arab world. He sees himself as a grand strategist and will make tactical concessions if he is persuaded that his over-all goals will be achieved. . . . His self-confidence has permitted him to make bold initiatives, often overriding his advisors' objections."

A finished study was disseminated in April 1977, on the eve of Sadat's state visit to the United States. Israeli politics were in acute disarray at the time. Yitzak Rabin was forced to step aside as Labor Party leader in part because of revelations of his wife's financial activities, and the controversial Shimon Peres became leader with the elections of the Knesset only a month away. On reading the study of Sadat on a Friday, President Carter requested for his reading the next Monday a similar study of Shimon Peres, who, it was widely assumed—despite the Labor Party's difficulties—would be the next prime minister of Israel. (There has been an assumption that we maintain such studies as "shelf items" on all leaders of significance.) Modestly disavowing superhuman abilities, we indicated we would immediately begin research on a personality study on Peres, and returned to debrief again the shuttle diplomats.

We were in the midst of the first draft when the stunning election upset occurred which brought Menachem Begin to power. With retrospective wisdom, most analysts

SECRET**Personality Profiles**

have attributed Peres' loss to Labor Party complacency and widespread voter disgust with allegations of corruption by the Labor government.*

With the election of Menachem Begin, the material on Peres was put aside for another day, and research was immediately commenced on the new prime minister. In contrast to Peres, who was well known to a number of U.S. Government officials, there had been little official contact with Begin. But there was a rich source of information in the open literature, for in two autobiographic works, the "White Nights" and "The Revolt," Begin had revealed a great deal of the experience which had honed his attitude. His preoccupation with legal precision and his inability to restrain himself from clarifying imprecision was well illustrated by his arguing with his Russian jailers about details of the Soviet legal code. Furthermore, in analyzing the form as well as the content of his writing, it was possible to understand some of the complexities of his cognitive style. Later, Ambassador Lewis provided particularly illuminating personal observations of the new prime minister's personality. The CAPPB study was disseminated in July 1977, in time for Begin's first visit with President Carter.

Once a personality study is completed, with a thorough analysis of the basic personality structure, it forms a basis for continued monitoring of the subject. This is particularly important for an individual like Begin, who had not coped with national leadership before. A major question raised but unanswered by the initial study was whether this leader, who had spent his lifetime in opposition, could function as a leader for all the people, utilizing skills of compromise and developing consensus.

The creative diplomacy of November and December of 1977, highlighted by Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, placed even greater emphasis on the personalities of the two key actors. A particularly interesting aspect of this visit, and something probably insufficiently attended to, was the impact of the media upon political behavior and the conduct of negotiations. Sadat's already special view of himself was given a new boost. We initially characterized this personality reaction "the Barbara Walter syndrome," but by summer of 1978, as it grew exponentially, designated it as Sadat's Nobel Prize complex. As we followed his political behavior particularly closely over the next several months, one of the most interesting changes had to do with the sharp increase in the first person singular. The frequency of the word "I" increased dramatically in Sadat's statements. There were accounts suggesting that Sadat would not accept reports indicating that his goals for Egypt and himself were in trouble.

*This is not the first occasion when the request for a personality study appeared to precipitate the downfall of a leader. The publication of a study of King Idris preceded the takeover of Libya by Qadhafi in a coup by two weeks. A principal conclusion of the study of Rene Barrientos of Bolivia was that "because of a strong need to prove himself as a man, Barrientos would likely burn himself out before his time." Barrientos died shortly after publication, having piloted his helicopter into a high-tension wire. Just in the past year, the program was having a remarkable record. Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa resigned because of poor health shortly after the publication of the personality study on the very day a major analysis of the decision-making structure in the Vorster government was disseminated. The succession problem in the Soviet Union was thrown into disarray by the death of Kulakov, one of the prime contenders to succeed Brezhnev. His unexpected death by a heart attack followed by two weeks initiation of research on his study. Our study of Boumediene of Algeria was being drafted when Boumediene suffered an incapacitating and ultimately fatal cerebellar hemorrhage. An attempt to assassinate Prime Minister-elect Ohira of Japan was made on the very day our draft study was submitted for editing. Most recently, the initiation of a major research study on Ugandan leader Idi Amin Dada was followed almost immediately by a Tanzanian counterattack on Uganda, and on the day the study was disseminated Tanzanian troops were reported in the streets of Kampala. Although this pattern appears to transcend coincidence, it is not true that initiation of a CAPPB personality study is being used as an alternative to covert action.

There was a consequent shrinkage of the leadership circle around Sadat to those who would support his optimism.

In parallel, Prime Minister Begin demonstrated a continuing facility for statements of a provocative nature, often precipitated by reporter's questions. A member of our center traveled to Israel to update the earlier study of Begin and focused extensively on some of the growing oppositional properties in Begin's personality.

The prominence of these personality features led to a proposal that one of the dinner seminars hosted periodically by the Director of Central Intelligence be devoted to the topic of "The role of personality in the Middle East conflict." The dinner was held in the spring of 1978, attended by a number of those who had been intimately involved in Middle East negotiations, including Ambassador-at-large Alfred Atherton, Ambassador to Egypt Herman Elts, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Harold Saunders, and Dr. William Quandt, the NSC's senior Near Eastern specialist.

In pulling together materials for this meeting we focused particularly on matters of form, entirely apart from political substance, and addressed such issues as Sadat's abhorrence of detail contrasted with Begin's predilection for precision and legalism. This precipitated a lively discussion among the participants on just how different Begin and Sadat were as personalities, and the problems these differences made when they were being dealt with in concert. One senior official advanced the notion that the personality differences were so profound that the two leaders should never be brought together in the same room. The task of preparing for the dinner discussions and distilling and analyzing the proceedings led us to sharpen the focus of our analysis on the stylistic differences between Begin and Sadat, and helped pave the way for the focused personality materials produced in support of the Camp David summit.

In focusing on the differences, there was an explicit analysis of the problems in simultaneous negotiation which these differences would produce, with some recommendations for dealing with these diverse personalities. The special circumstances of Camp David temporarily narrowed the differences between these two extraordinary individuals and made possible the Camp David accords. Needless to say, the gap persists. Above and beyond the massive political problems which must be overcome to reach a settlement, the fundamentally differing personalities of the two key actors remain a major source of tension in this historic drama, and will require continued observation and evaluation by the intelligence community.

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*Intelligence Vignette***HAYM SALOMON,
THE SPY WHO BECAME AMERICA'S BANKER**

(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)

Haym Salomon, sometimes referred to as the "financier of the American Revolution" because of his large financial commitment to the American cause (for which he never was repaid), deserves recognition in another quarter as well—as an American spy.

Salomon had a personal commitment to liberty. He was born about 1740 at Lissa, Poland, where his parents had settled after being driven first from Spain, then from Portugal. As a young man, Salomon had the opportunity to travel throughout Europe and to acquire skills in several European languages, and in his native land became an advocate of Polish independence. In 1772, when another pogrom threatened, his parents fled to safety in Holland, and Salomon set out first for England, then for America, arriving in New York in 1773. He established himself as a commission merchant and broker, and is said to have involved himself in the activities of the Sons of Liberty.

When the British occupied New York, Salomon remained in the city, continuing his patriot activities. On September 22, 1776—the same day that Nathan Hale was hanged as a spy in New York—British authorities there arrested Haym Salomon as a spy. He was fortunate not to meet Hale's fate, at first being confined to Sugar House Prison, but later was released and turned over to General Heister, to serve as an interpreter in the Hessian commissary department. While detailed to the Germans, Salomon is credited with inducing a number of them to resign or to desert. After another short period of imprisonment, Salomon was released on parole and returned to his business. He continued to serve as an undercover agent, targeting the Hessians for desertion and using his personal finances to assist American prisoners.

In August 1778, Salomon was again arrested, charged with being an accomplice in a plot to burn the British fleet and to destroy His Majesty's warehouses in New York. He was condemned to death for sabotage and sent to the Provost to await execution. On August 11, 1778, Salomon bribed his jailer with a belt of gold guineas which he had smuggled into the prison, and made his escape to Philadelphia. He subsequently served as paymaster for the French forces in America, handled most of the wartime financial subsidies from France and Holland, conducted government sales of privateer contraband, was a purchasing agent for the Continental Army, and was the sole broker for the sale of Congress' bills of exchange. Far from profiting by these assignments of trust, he returned all his commissions and by the end of the war had advanced close to \$700,000 of his own funds to the new government and had made many loans to colonial leaders. After the war he suffered heavy financial reverses and died in bankruptcy.

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Intelligence in search of a consumer

THE MAYAGUEZ RESCUE OPERATION REVISITED

David Mark

On 12 May 1975, the U.S. merchant ship *Mayaguez* was fired upon and seized by Cambodian forces near Poulo Wai in the Gulf of Siam. The ship, a 480-foot, 10,000-ton container craft, was bound from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand, with a cargo of commercial goods and supplies.

After its seizure by Cambodia, the U.S. crew was taken to Koh Tang, a 3-mile by 2-mile jungle island approximately 34 miles from Kompong Som. Attempts to negotiate the release of the ship and crew were unsuccessful and, by 13 May, the White House viewed the use of force as the only way to prevent the crew members from eventually being taken to the Cambodian mainland and possibly imprisoned. On 14 May the United States launched a military strike against the Cambodian island of Koh Tang. A major part of the basic intelligence on which the action rested was provided by CIA's Domestic Collection Division (DCD).

This article relates the role of one element of the intelligence community in support of policy makers involved in planning for the *Mayaguez* rescue operation. In passing, it shows how standard tasking mechanisms tend to be overlooked or bypassed in a crisis, and shows the importance of improvisation and flexibility at such times. The story of the DCD role in the *Mayaguez* rescue operation is not well known within the intelligence community, and makes an interesting narrative, presented here in chronological order.

At 1100 on 13 May 1975, a telephone call was received by a junior DCD headquarters officer from an officer of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) who wanted to know whether DCD could obtain photographs or charts of Poulo Wai. He explained that the Navy had levied a priority request on NPIC for the information but NPIC files had no material on the island. Someone believed that oil exploration had been conducted around Poulo Wai; if so, perhaps a U.S. oil company might have charts, photographs or other data on the island. Could DCD help?

DCD's New York and Houston offices maintain extensive contacts with U.S. oil companies, and they were immediately asked to respond, by 1700 if possible, with anything that might meet the Navy's priority request. By 1630 both New York and Houston had reported that charts and photographs of Poulo Wai had been located and would be relayed to headquarters as soon as possible. Both offices volunteered detailed textual information on the island terrain and on the location of Cambodian installations and personnel.

The response was gratifying, but when the DCD officer tried to reach his NPIC contact by phone at 1635, he drew a blank. Without the NPIC intermediary, he had no way of knowing who wanted the information, how valuable it was, or how urgently

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The Mayaguez

it might be needed. He had a pretty good idea from the *Washington Post* and other media coverage that Poulo Wai must be related to the growing crisis surrounding the capture of the *Mayaguez*, but officially he was working in the dark. So at 1645 he called the CIA Operations Center to confirm his assumptions and enlist some help in finding his anonymous consumer. The watch officer on duty, although unaware of any request for intelligence on Poulo Wai, suggested that DCD contact the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Southeast Asia. By 1700 the NIO was on the phone, and it did not take him long to recognize that the information DCD was trying to relay was a partial response to a set of requirements originally laid on through his own office. He asked DCD to begin immediate action to develop similar topographical information on nearby Koh Tang island.

The DCD officer explained that action might not be possible until the next morning, since DCD's operations were geared to the normal hours of its sources in the business community. There was only the briefest pause at the NIO's end of the conversation before he replied: The information needed on Koh Tang is central to the situation involving the *Mayaguez*. No matter what it takes, or how slim the chances are for getting the information, you have got to go after it now with the highest possible priority. From now on, he concluded, you can assume that your consumer is the President and that he will get any information you can develop.

New York and Houston were advised of these new requirements and priorities, and New York was able to respond with some additional data on Poulo Wai and some initial information on Koh Tang immediately. At 1800 Houston called with more material on Poulo Wai, but nothing on Koh Tang. Pressed to pursue the search, the Houston field officer replied that he was reviewing a list of sources who had not been contacted in some time in the nebulous hope that something in their background might provide a lead to a source for the information.

In 15 minutes Houston was back on the line to say that a source had been located. He was an independent consultant to a U.S. oil company who had done some survey work on the island a few years earlier. He had the maps and charts, but it would take a few hours for him to pull the material together and get it to DCD. With the NIO's injunctions ringing in his ears, the headquarters officer asked Houston to get their source to a telephone and put him in direct touch with the NIO.

At 1830 this was done and the source briefed the NIO directly on Koh Tang's terrain as he remembered it. When he had taken all the data down, the NIO told the Houston field officer that his information couldn't have been more relevant or more timely, and that he would be passing it on immediately to the DCI for his appearance at an emergency National Security Council meeting at 2200. With the DCI briefed and on his way, the NIO told Houston to cease operations for the night at 2130.

Promptly at 0800 the next day, 14 May, the NIO was on the phone to DCD headquarters with a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the source located the previous evening be flown to Washington for a military debriefing at 1600 the same day. Houston's response, at 0830, was that it was impossible to obtain a seat on a flight that would meet the debriefing deadline. When this word was relayed to the NIO, he told DCD to sit tight while he tried to get some help from the Pentagon.

At 0900 the NIO advised DCD that a military aircraft was being diverted to Houston at the direct orders of the Joint Chiefs. The Houston field officer and the source would be flown direct to Andrews Air Force Base where a helicopter would be waiting to terry them to the Pentagon. Houston was advised, and the field officer and his source departed post haste to meet their flight.

*The Mayaguez***SECRET**

At 1530 DCD headquarters got the word that their field officer and his source had landed at Andrews and were on their way to the Pentagon; the headquarters project officer and his boss promptly left to meet them.

At 1600 the debriefing session began in a crowded National Military Command Center. In attendance were representatives of the Joint Chiefs and other ranking officers involved in planning the *Mayaguez* rescue operation. The DCD source gave a thorough description of Koh Tang's terrain, population centers and fortifications; pressed, he gave his assessment of potential problem areas. Asked directly by a Joint Staff officer for his view of the best area on the island to land a strike force, he gave his opinion. The essential details of his briefing were cabled directly to the assembling strike force.

The debriefing ended at 1800 and the source was escorted to the NIO's office at CIA headquarters by the three DCD men. He was still there—in case more information was needed—at 1930 when word came that the strike against Koh Tang had been given Presidential approval. A short time later the DCI, enroute from the White House, called to ask if he could meet the source, and at 2130 the group met in his office to receive from the Director the President's personal appreciation for their efforts. The next day the source was flown back to Houston on the same Air Force jet that had brought him to Washington.


DCD's role in the *Mayaguez* operation was notable in several respects. It is an office more accustomed than most to receiving its requirements by way of formal and often elaborate tasking channels many times removed from the ultimate consumer. As noted, it is geared to the businessman's working day, and much of its collection work proceeds at the pace of its commercial sources. It obviously is not as well known to tasking officers as NPIC or its own parent organization, the Directorate of Operations. In this case DCD got its tasking requirement almost by accident well after the initial requirement had been laid on other intelligence collection components, and for awhile DCD was working without any official sense of the importance and urgency of its task. Having found one needle in a haystack half a continent away within one working day, we were promptly sent back to find a smaller one the same night. With a little bit of luck, a lot of determination and professionalism by a few skilled officers and, eventually, some well placed assistance, we put the requester and the source face to face in just over 24 hours through a process that operated almost entirely outside normal tasking channels and on a wholly informal basis.

Whatever one may think of the purpose and the result of the *Mayaguez* rescue operation, it was DCD that provided the essential, ground-level intelligence needed by the strike force to bring it off. In the process, DCD gained some valuable insights into the operation of the higher levels of the crisis management mechanism. One can hope that the crisis managers and the tasking channels in between learned something about DCD's potential and capabilities as well.

(All of the foregoing article is classified SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.)

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Saratov Engels airfield

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Allen Dulles prices a picture

THE MILLION-DOLLAR PHOTOGRAPH

Dino A. Brugioni

Although a technological intelligence revolution occurred under his administration as Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles remained a case officer at heart and often had difficulty comprehending the technical intricacies of the collection and analysis systems over which he presided. Kelly Johnson, the aircraft designer, would wax eloquent in his presence on the splendid aerodynamic qualities of the U-2. Richard Bissell had patiently explained the technological breakthroughs of thin-based film and panoramic cameras, and Arthur Lundahl had explained many times how modern photo interpretation was performed. Dulles' grasp of the technological processes underlying these systems remained remote, but he had no difficulty appreciating the results.

One of the burning questions of the day was whether the United States was suffering a "bomber gap" in comparison with the Soviet Union, and a principal task of the intelligence community was to ascertain the number of Bison bombers in the Soviet inventory.

When the U-2 photographed the bomber arsenal at Saratov Engels airfield, the Bisons were lined up wingtip-to-wingtip, clearly showing that there were fewer than had been estimated. The bomber gap controversy had for all practical purposes been settled.

When Lundahl and Bissell spread the photo before Mr. Dulles, the Director lit his pipe, took several deep puffs, turned to Frank Wisner, his covert intelligence chief, and asked, "How much would you have paid for the information in this photography?" Wisner thought for a moment and answered, "About a million dollars."

In subsequent testimony before Congressional committees, at White House intelligence briefings, budget hearings, and on other occasions, Mr. Dulles frequently displayed the photograph. But he never referred to it as the Saratov Engels or the Bison photo. NPIC always knew what briefing board he wanted when he or his aides would call to ask that the "million-dollar photo" be included in his briefing packet.

(This entire article and the accompanying photograph are classified SECRET.)

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*Revolutionary origins of Soviet
communications intelligence*

SOVIET COMINT AND THE CIVIL WAR, 1918-1921*

Thomas R. Hammant

Translator's note: The following is a translation of the article "The Organization and Combat Use of Radio Intelligence During the Civil War," by Col. Yu. Ural'skij in *Voenno-istoricheskij zhurnal* (Journal of Military History), Moscow, No. 11, 1972. The article gives a rare glimpse into the early operations of Soviet Comint and the importance that the top leadership gave to it from the very beginning of the Soviet regime. Footnotes citing Soviet archival records have been eliminated, and a few explanatory footnotes, enclosed in brackets, have been added.

When setting up control agencies, units, and subdivisions of the communications troops of the Red Army that was being created to defend the Soviet authority, the Revvoensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] of the Republic (RSVR)¹ attached great importance to the use of radio as a means of communication among the troops and to its application in the interests of intelligence.²

During the period of the civil war, the radio situation that had developed on all fronts favored the organization of radio intelligence by the Red Army, since the combat actions encompassed a large territory of Soviet Russia and were of a mobile nature. The interventionists and White Guards made rather broad communications use of fixed and mobile (field) radio sets, which were supplied to the headquarters of their armies, corps, and divisions, as well as to naval vessels and merchant ships that were carrying troops, arms, ammunition, and other military supplies to the White Armies of the Entente.³ Attached to the headquarters of Kolchak, Denikin, and Wrangel were military-diplomatic missions from the Entente countries with a staff of military advisors who had radio sets at their disposal. They maintained contact with London, Paris, Warsaw, Athens, Constantinople, and other cities.

The interventionists and the internal counter-revolutionaries carried out radio communications in the range of 250-3500 meters, with wave lengths from 290 to 740 meters being used for field communications. The White Guards had at their disposal the radio sets of the former Russian Army, as well as American, British, and French equipment that had been supplied by the Entente. For example, Kolchak's

*For previous articles on the origins of Russian communications intelligence, see works by the same author in *Studies* Summer 1977 XXI/2, p. 21, and Summer 1978 XXII/2, p. 29. This article is adapted from the September 1978 issue of CRYPTOLOG.

¹[The RSVR was set up on 2 September 1918 to unify all military control at the fronts and in the rear during the civil war period.]

² Radio intelligence had sprung up and had received its organizational formulation during World War I.

³[It appears that the Soviet use of the term "Entente" includes all the non-Russian interventionist forces, rather than just the World War I Allies.]

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headquarters in Omsk had a radio set with a power of 30 kilowatts, which was used to set up communications along the lines: Omsk-Arkhangel'sk-London and Omsk-Nikolaev-Constantinople-Paris. The fixed radio sets had a power of 3-30 kilowatts, and the field and shipboard radio sets, respectively, 0.5 and 3 kilowatts; this made it possible, on medium and long waves, to cover rather considerable distances either directly or by way of intermediate radio sets. At the same time this allowed radio intelligence to monitor the enemy's radio transmissions from a considerable distance.

There was almost no observance of communications security or discipline among the White forces.⁴ Operational summaries concerning combat operations at the fronts, and sometimes even combat orders, were transmitted by radio in the clear. Sometimes the addresses in the radio messages were not encrypted, for example: "Urgent. Operational [summary] No. 3. Via Krinichnaya by radio to General Shkuro. . ." The radio data [callsigns, frequencies, etc.] of field radio sets were not changed for long periods of time. It was possible to determine who the radio sets belonged to by their call-signs, for example: PGW—poezd generala Wrangelya (General Wrangel's train); ALM—cruiser *Almaz*; Zha—destroyer *Zharkij*; ShI—submarine *Shipka*; GRV—*Gur'ev*; etc. The grouping of enemy troops and the department and movements of headquarters could be learned from radio messages; from radio direction-finding information, from conversations in the clear between officials, or, indirectly, when the field radio set ceased operating and then started broadcasting again, but with reduced audibility.

Thus, the White and interventionist radio communications were a priceless source of information for the Red Army radio intelligence service concerning the enemy.

When, in the course of the civil war, Soviet Russia proved to be surrounded by a fiery ring of fronts, telegraphic communication with the Western European countries was cut off, and the delivery of foreign newspapers and magazines stopped, there was a sharp limitation in the amount of incoming information concerning international life. However, as during the years of World War I, the international radio stations (Paris, Lyon, Nauen, Carnarvon, Corsi, Rome) continued to transmit regularly (within the wave-length band of 600 to 1500 meters) newspaper reports concerning the international and military situation. The reports submitted by the foreign correspondents accredited to the headquarters of the White armies traveled along these channels. All this was of interest and enabled the RSVR, and the Red Army headquarters and troops, to intercept that information and to be informed concerning the international and military events, and to obtain valuable information about the enemy.

For the Petrograd Telegraph Agency (PTA) and subsequently the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA), the interception of foreign reports was carried out at the Moscow, Tver', and Tsarskoe Selo radio stations, which had been constructed in 1914 for the purpose of linking the Russian Army's General Staff with the frontline staffs and with the Allies. In April 1918 these and other radio stations in the War Department were transferred, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars, to the People's Commissariat for Mail and Telegraph. In order to increase the amount of information, in the facilities occupied by ROSTA, its own radio station was set up in

⁴[It also appears that the Soviets had a problem in maintaining communications security as well, especially during the Red Army's offensive against Poland in the Civil War. According to a former Colonel of the Polish Army General Staff, Polish Comint units kept the General Staff constantly informed on the movements and intentions of the Red Army. See M. Stezhinskij, *Radiotelegraf Kak Sredstvo Razvedki* (Radiotelegraph as a Source of Intelligence) (Translated from the Polish), Moscow, Voenizdat., 1932, pp. 20-21, cited in Marshal I.T. Peresypkin, *Voennaya Radiosvyaz'* (Military Radio Communications), Moscow, Voenizdat., 1962.]

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1919; that radio station received reports from the correspondents at the civil war fronts, and also intercepted foreign telegrams. They were used in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, which regularly printed surveys of military operations at the front, and, in addition, provided special "pages for the Red Army man." A similar station was located at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

The organization of a radio intelligence service in the Army dates from the beginning of 1919. However, attempts to carry out radio intelligence and to intercept enemy radio messages had been undertaken earlier by Red Army units. For example, during the second half of 1918, the interception of foreign reports was organized at radio stations 504, 600, 601, and 602 of the Western Sector of the screen detachments which had been intended for operational communications. This was carried out by radiotelegraph operators who were familiar with radio intelligence from having served in the old Russian army. During the period from July to October 1918, they intercepted 1576 radio messages. In July 1918, radio station 504 carried out surveillance and interception of the radio messages from the field radio stations of the Kransnov troops which were operating in the Don area. The necessity of organizing not only radio intelligence, but also radio counterintelligence, was recognized by the front headquarters. For example, the Board for the Administration of the Military Telegraph Communications of the Northern Front, in a report to the military commissar of the Northern Front in November 1918, noted, ". . . in order to detect and to provide warnings concerning the possible operation of enemy radio stations in the rear of our armies, and also in order to obtain information concerning the location and operation of radio stations attached to enemy military units, it is necessary to set up radio direction-finding stations and to organize radio monitoring on the front. . . ."

The formation of radio intelligence subdivisions began in January 1919. Every front and army headquarters was supposed to have one intercept station (*priemoinformatsionnaya stantsiya*) and a radio direction-finding station. The former was intended for the reception of ROSTA summaries beginning with the words "to all Soviet deputies, to all editorial offices, to all propaganda points," and for the interception of foreign newspaper reports and radio messages transmitted by the enemy's field radio sets. It was manned by eight persons and had one or two radio receivers with a vacuum-tube amplifier. The latter was supposed to detect enemy radio stations and get bearings on them. The staff at the radio direction-finding station consisted of 19 persons. In January 1919, for the purpose of supporting the Field Staff of the RVSR with intelligence information, a radio intercept station manned by 22 persons was set up at Serpukhovo.

Radio intelligence tasks were frequently assigned also to the field radio stations of troop staffs. But that was caused by an acute shortage of radio facilities and radiotelegraph operators working in the intelligence field.

The radio apparatus used for radio intelligence consisted of old models and was produced both by foreign companies and in the shops of the Navy Department. For the most part, they were detection receivers with a wave length range of 240 to 5100 meters. With the aid of changeable circuits, the limit of the range was extended to 15,000 meters. In order to increase the sensitivity at the radio receivers, three-cascade amplifiers operating on radio tubes were used.

Because of the shortage of radio direction-finding stations, an engineer at the Communications Directorate of the Red Army, V. I. Bazhenov, invented a special antenna. This antenna made it possible to adapt for purposes of direction-finding the ordinary field radio sets.⁵

⁵ See *Instruktsiya po prispособлению полевых радиостанций к радиопеленгованию по способу инженера Баженова* (Instruction Manual for Adapting Field Radio Sets to Radio Direction-Finding by Engineer Bazhenov's Method), Moscow, 1922.

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Organizationally speaking, the radio intercept and radio direction-finding stations were part of the radiotelegraph battalions of fronts and armies.

The over-all management of the radio intelligence service was carried out by the radio department of the Communications Directorate of the Red Army, and, at the front, by radio-communications and radio-intelligence sections of the communications directorates of the fronts and armies. The sections summarized the radio-intercept data, and drew up informational documents—daily radio-intelligence summaries and diagrams showing enemy radio communications as they had reconstructed it. These materials were intended for the Field Headquarters of the RSVR and for the intelligence sections of the appropriate staffs. The most important information was immediately transmitted by telegraph to the Field Headquarters of the RSVR and to other interested headquarters.

It should, however, be noted that the possibility of organizing and making combat use of Red Army radio intelligence at the fronts was limited because of the shortage of radio equipment and specialists. As a result of this circumstance, on all fronts except the Caucasian Front it was impossible to carry out completely the radio direction-finding of enemy radio sets.

During the civil war years, the radio-intercept stations intercepted a large quantity of radio reports issued by foreign telegraph agencies. During 1919-1921, approximately 1000 intelligence summaries were issued solely on the basis of materials intercepted by just one radio station, attached to the RSVR (translated from English, French, German, and Italian). Summaries of radio-intercept materials from the foreign press were reported to V. I. Lenin. They were also regularly provided to members of the RSVR, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin, the Moscow Oblast' Committee of the RKP(b), the Cheka,⁶ ROSTA, and the directorates and departments of the RSVR Field Headquarters on matters pertaining to their areas of responsibility.

The communiques transmitted by foreign radio stations contained important political, economic, and military information. For example, a radio message intercepted early in 1919 revealed Kolchak's over-all strategic plan for the 1919 spring offensive. In a statement made by Kolehak in Omsk, it was started, "We will attempt to establish contact with Arkhangel'sk, and as soon as we succeed in occupying a line on the Volga, we shall establish contact with the south and General Denikin, after which we will change over to the offensive and advance on Moscow. Seizing Moscow is our primary goal. . . ."

In his article "How the Bourgeoisie Uses Renegades," V. I. Lenin emphasized the value of foreign radio communiques. "Our radio stations," he wrote, "intercept radio messages from Carnarvon (England), Paris, and other European centers. Paris is now the center of the worldwide alliance of imperialists and, therefore, its radio messages are frequently of particular interest."⁷

The radio waves were the first to carry across the front line the information that the Entente was preparing a new campaign against Soviet Russia (the chief reliance being placed on bourgeois Poland and Wrangel).

During the period of Red Army combat operations against Kolchak in 1918-1919, the radio intelligence service on the Eastern Front successfully monitored the radio communications of Kolchak's Siberian, Western, and Urals White Cossack armies, as well as White Guard radio stations in the Astrakhan, Gur'ev, Krasnovodsk, and Baku

⁶ [Secret police; predecessor of KGB.]

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.* (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 39, p. 182.

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areas. Kolchak's radio contact with the Entente was also established. Radio messages and radio conversations in the clear made it possible to establish the location of the headquarters of Kolchak, Denikin, the Caspian Front, the Caucasian and Don Armies, the Astrakhan Detachment, and the group of forces in the Northern Caucasus.

In the summer of 1919, in combat engagements against the White Cossack Urals Army, the enemy's radio communications were monitored not only by the radio-intercept stations at the headquarters of the Turkestan Front and the I and IV Armies, but also by radio station 529 at the headquarters of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 596 at the 24th Rifle Division, and 530 at the 25th Rifle Division.

On the Southern and Southeastern Fronts in 1919, radio stations 504, 522, 518, and others monitored the field radio stations of Denikin's army and the fixed stations situated on the coast of the Black Sea (Nikolaev, Odessa, Sevastopol). On the basis of radio messages and radio conversations in the clear, the radio intelligence service on the Southern Front in May 1919 succeeded in revealing rather precisely a grouping of Denikin troops in the south and in noting a concentration of the Volunteer Army in the Azov-Donetsk sector, the III Don Army in the Lugansk sector, the II Don Army on the Northern Donets, the I Don Army to the south of the Don, in the Tsaritsyn sector, and General Wrangel's Caucasian Army in the Northern Caucasus, and also succeeded in establishing the deployment of many of the White Guard troop headquarters.

On 5 October 1919 a radio intercept station at the IX Army headquarters intercepted and decrypted radiogram 04118, which contained a combat order issued by the Commander of the Voronezh Group, General-Lieutenant Shkuro. The order assigned tasks to the units of Shkuro's cavalry corps after its seizure of Voronezh. The information received was immediately transmitted to the headquarters of the Southeastern Front.

The radio intelligence service of the Red Army operated more successfully against Wrangel in the concluding phase of the civil war. Factors that contributed to this were the experience that had been accumulated in the combat use of radio facilities for purposes of intelligence, and the improvement in the supplying of technical equipment to radio battalions.

During the Red Army's combat actions against the Wrangel forces, many of the intercepted radio messages dealt with enemy groupings, the redeployment of headquarters, and the headlong flight of the White Guardists from the Crimea. For example, in one radio intelligence summary issued by the headquarters of the Southern Front it was indicated, "From radio messages intercepted by the chief front [station] from radio stations 6ZhT, 7ZY, and 5PY, one can make the following conclusion: radio station 5PY, attached to the 2nd Don Cavalry Division, approximately between 29 September and 1 October, was transferred, together with the division, to the area to the north of Volkovakha; previously that radio station had been in the Aleksandrovka area." The data obtained was subsequently confirmed by tactical reconnaissance.

Beginning on 8 August 1920 the radio stations on the Caucasian Front noted an exceptionally large amount of radio traffic in the Sea of Azov area. The possibility of a landing operation was raised. And, indeed, on 14 August, under the command of General Ulagay, a landing was made in the Akhtarsk area. Front-line radio intelligence continuously monitored the enemy's radio communications, intercepting radio messages and official conversations. The information thus received contributed to the defeat of this landing.

On 16 October a radio intercept station of the Caucasian Front headquarters intercepted an order from the Commander of the II Army, General Abramov, which

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had been sent in the clear. That order concerned the changeover on 17 October to the offensive against the Red Army units on the Kakhovka bridgehead. Knowledge of the enemy's plan of operations helped the headquarters of the Southern Front—to whom the intercepted White order was forwarded—to destroy the Wrangel forces at Kakhovka.

In the final stage of the Red Army's combat actions in the fight for the Crimea, the White Guards did not have enough time to encrypt their combat documents, and the radio traffic was sent in the clear. The radio messages contained information concerning the withdrawal of units, their evacuation from the Crimea. For example, changes in the enemy's groupings were mentioned in the 25 October 1920 radio-intelligence summary issued by the Southern Front: "... radio station 0Ch, attached to I Army headquarters, was removed, for transfer to a new location. Apparently the enemy has begun evacuating Melitopol. Radio station 8IT, which serves the headquarters of the troops operating in the Nikolaev area, also has been removed for transfer to a new location. During the past few days we have observed almost no activity by the enemy's field radio stations. One can assume that the headquarters of the divisions and corps to which the field stations are attached are being redeployed."

Radio communications also provided information about the course of the evacuation of Wrangel's troops from the Crimea. For example, General Kutepov reported to the fleet commander that he had 6500 officers and men on board a steamship, and there was absolutely no water or bread. He also reported that "the LAZAR, which was being towed by it," had sunk as a result of a leak. The KRONSHTADT reported to Constantinople that it had absolutely no coal or food supplies, it had 5000 passengers on board, and was towing the ZVONKIJ.

On the basis of the radio intercept information, the Commander of the Southern Front, M. V. Frunze, in order dated 15 November 1920, demanded the "development of the most energetic efforts on the part of submarines and the liquidation of the enemy's attempts to use the sea to escape the blows being dealt by our armies."¹

Thus, it follows from what has been stated that during the years of the civil war the Red Army's radio facilities were used successfully for intelligence purposes against the enemy.

At a conference of front-level chiefs of communications troops that was held in 1921, the activities of radio intelligence were rated highly. The radio intelligence service that had been created in our Armed Forces "completely justified its purpose and provided the Red Army with valuable material concerning the enemy, thus helping the Red Army to achieve victory." The role and importance of communications troops, including the role and importance of the radio facilities, were also given their proper credit by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which, in recognition of the valorous and extremely valuable work for the benefit of Soviet Russia, expressed its appreciation to the entire complement of commissars, commanders, and Red Army men in the Red Army communications troops.

The combat experience of using radio equipment for intelligence purposes during the years of the civil war was used for the further development of the radio intelligence service in the Red Army.

¹ M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny (M. V. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts). Collection of articles, Moscow, 1941, p. 448. Unfortunately, the submarine forces could not execute this order. The two submarines in the Black Sea—the AG-23 and the AG-24—were not ready for operations in the open sea

An Essay

ON OPTIMISM

Dr. John L. Stephenson

A few years back a statement so frequently heard that it almost became an aphorism was, "An optimist learns Russian, a pessimist learns Chinese." Today in intelligence circles a similar expression containing another dour thought might well be, "An optimist learns to live with oversight, a pessimist learns to live with public disclosure." But the path along which intelligence officials are now traveling has no simple sign-posts that give absolute directions. Should the language of choice be Chinese or Russian? How much should the Congress and the public know? The mind set needed by anyone who would thread his way through these thickets is that of the optimist, not the pessimist.

Each of us has a definition of what optimism means. Generally we think of an optimist as one who sees more good than evil in the world and, when there is conflict, finds good triumphing over evil. There is no intention here to advocate that the intelligence community should have a Panglossian view of the world. We do not necessarily live in the best of all possible worlds and, in fact, may not inhabit the only world. As intelligence officers, we should see the path to the future as an opportunity to optimize our creative abilities. The future does not have to be a shock, nor should it be seen as a hopeless thicket. It should be seen as a tomorrow of opportunity in which intelligence history will be made by those who have the foresight to recognize that the next tomorrow will be even more challenging. That is the optimism which we should seek to cultivate.

Nowadays pessimism is running rampant in the country. Its descendant, greed, is popularized in the media as the "me society." Grab it today; there may not be an opportunity tomorrow. We cannot question that the world is in turmoil. Who knows what will happen tomorrow? The task of intelligence is to help clarify the situation for the U.S. Government. With an attitude of pessimism, however, the result is paralysis. When the concept of optimism is forsaken, "no" is an easy answer to give requests for new intelligence initiatives. To allow new initiatives to be stymied by pessimism is tantamount to losing the battle without even fielding the forces.

Optimism, on the other hand, spawns benefits over and above accomplishing an organization's mission. To get and keep good people an organization must maintain an environment of achievement. Optimists are achievers. They are the ones who will attract and hold others to their cause. Good morale should never have to become an organizational goal in and of itself. It will come from doing good work, from achieving, from seeing the opportunity of the future. The stimulating atmosphere of optimism, not the paralysis and decay of pessimism, is what intelligence needs not only to measure the future, but also to create its own vitality.

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On Optimism

Estimates, which by definition concern the future, are the ultimate refinement of an intelligence organization's purpose, and the estimative process is the breath and blood of the intelligence organization's existence. Optimism, in the sense of a desire to contemplate the future as an opportunity for creativity, needs to be infused into the entire chain of events that takes place in arriving at an estimate. If this optimism, this active desire to address the future and master it, has been dulled, then we need to rekindle it.

Perhaps in our maturation as an Agency we have tended to squeeze out of our people the attitudes and thought processes that give rise to innovation. Innovation is needed in devising new methods of collection. Innovation is needed, perhaps even more importantly, in finding the hidden requirements (or questions) which, if answered, will produce that flash of understanding which is so critical in the estimative process.

As an aid in coming to grips with the problem of a lack of innovation, pose to yourself the question, "Why do we place so much emphasis on the study of history when all our lives will be spent in the future?" A discussion of that question, especially by people whose profession is estimating the future, would do well to conclude that educational time should be allotted to a course of study called "future." This is not to denigrate the lessons of history. Rather it is to force us to look ahead, to be imaginative, to contemplate the future with an air of optimism, for history is not created in its own image.

If we can begin to see the future as an outlet for our creativity, then maybe the optimism that blossomed in our youth will be extended in time. From these blossoms will come not the decayed fruit of middle-age self-doubt and pessimism, but rather the seed of new opportunity and optimism.

Intelligence Vignette

JOHN JAY ON SECRET INTELLIGENCE

(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)

... There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions who would rely on the secrecy of the President who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties that although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.

John Jay
The "Federalist"

COMMUNICATION FROM THE BOARD OF EDITORS

For 23 years *Studies in Intelligence* has provided a medium for the publication of articles on theoretical, doctrinal, operational and historical aspects of intelligence work. More and more frequently in recent years readers have urged on the Editors the adoption of a more contemporary and forward-looking viewpoint in the selection and commissioning of articles. A criticism often heard is that articles and book reviews tend to focus on the "good old days" of World War II and the early years of the Cold War. Why, it is asked, do we read about contemporary operations only in commercially published works derived from unauthorized disclosures, from files released under the Freedom of Information Act, and from the pens of former employees? Why do the debates over the role of intelligence in an open democracy fill pages of the *Congressional Record* and the *Washington Post* but leave the pages of *Studies* untouched? Where are the articles by the current generation of intelligence practitioners that challenge the precepts of an earlier age and explore the problems of global intelligence in a multi-polar world?

The answers to these and other critical questions lie less with the Board of Editors than with our readers, who are both the object and the source of the articles published in *Studies*. As the last veterans of the OSS and the men who broke PURPLE and produced MAGIC pass into retirement, there is still a need to distill their wisdom and experience into tonics for the present and the future. But there is a much greater need for contemporary practitioners of our craft to come forward with the lessons they have learned and the perceptions they have of the future of intelligence.

The Board of Editors is persuaded that a modern and successful approach to intelligence work has indeed been developed during the past decades and that useful thinking is being devoted to the intelligence challenges of the future. It remains only for members of the present generation of intelligence practitioners to contribute to the continuing literature of our craft as the passing generation has contributed in its time.

We wish to make explicit, therefore, that the intended focus of *Studies in Intelligence* is on the contemporary and future practice of intelligence, as well as lessons from the past. As an essayist has written elsewhere in this issue, we see the future as a creative opportunity, and we earnestly solicit contributions from those who share our vision.

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

THE WIZARD WAR: BRITISH SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE, 1939-1945. By R. V. Jones. (Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, New York, 1978.) 556 pages.

The Wizard War is an important book for some of us but should be a joy for all who read it. It is an autobiographical account of R. V. Jones' experience as the "Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science)" on the British Air Staff during World War II. In that role, he is credited with the development of scientific intelligence, a credit I believe he deserves. In the course of the account, Jones and a handful of associates deal—in high boffin* style—with German attempts to overwhelm the British in the air war through increasingly sophisticated technological ploys including the use of navigational beams, radar defenses, airborne radar, electronic warfare, and, finally, the V-weapons.

With one notable exception, aficionados of R. V. Jones will find little new insofar as his war experiences are concerned; the book is largely a repackaging of previously published stories, often with the original prose intact. Added now, however, is the Enigma dimension, which proves to be large indeed and adds a credibility that some of the old stories seemed to lack. The attempt to uncover the meanings of project or operational codewords discovered through communications intercepts is particularly intriguing. But most importantly, for those who have come to admire Jones as an individual and to appreciate the effect of his personality, the tales run back to his childhood and family, his years in school and at the Clarendon Laboratory at Oxford under the direction of "the Prof," F. A. Lindemann, later to become Lord Cherwell and one of Britain's more controversial figures. Here, too, is a postscript, bittersweet, as memories of triumphs and glories are mixed with the sense that if only a Britain drifting downstream since 1945 could be reminded of past accomplishments it might abandon a "mood of self-seeking easement" in favor of a sense of purpose and service that would restore its stamina and capacity to act. It is no surprise to learn that Jones' father was a sergeant in the Grenadier Guards who demanded of his son discipline, precision, service and endurance.

Jones, if nothing else, is a dynamite storyteller, and it is this quality of the book that should delight even its Luddite readers. If you can't find excitement in glimpses of such scientific movers and shakers as Lindemann, Tizard, Watson-Watt, de Bye, Schroedinger, E. A. Milne and James Tuck as real people, you are still left with anecdotes that deserve retelling even if the names are forgotten. It is to the author's credit that he never fails to interrupt the war or slow the development of a vital countermeasure if he can throw in a good story about the people involved. It makes one admire the British system as well as to learn that good old Freddy Wintle (an Army major posted to Air Intelligence to coordinate information about German anti-aircraft gun defenses), after having been incarcerated in the Tower for threatening the Director of Air Intelligence with his revolver, flummoxed an Army court-martial by insisting that he had not meant to intimidate the Air Commodore since he well knew

* "boffin, n (origin unknown) Brit. slang, a scientific expert." (*Webster's Unabridged*. But see p. 46 below—Editor.)

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that "he is the type of officer that if you rushed into his room and shouted at the top of your voice 'the Air Ministry's on fire' all he would do would be to take up his pen and write a minute to someone about it!" Such stories are abundant and have been well polished in the retelling.

But all of this aside, the intelligence story is magnificent. The unravelling of *Knickebein*, the first of the German bomber navigation schemes, is a classic tale of technical intelligence analysis. All the elements we use today are there: clandestine reporting, prisoner interrogation, Elint, Comint, overhead photography, materiel exploitation, that beautiful, clean, logical analysis that is founded on a few physical principals, and good luck.

It was the breaking and countering of *Knickebein* that made Jones a major figure in British intelligence during the war and set him on the course of fathering scientific intelligence. It was the beginning of a love affair with Winston Churchill, who long remembered and wrote of Jones as the man who "broke the Bloody Beams." There is little purpose in recounting here the intelligence story itself; suffice it to say that the problems and the technical intelligence analysis were worthy of one another. Told by another participant, I am sure the stories would vary, with the pre-eminent role assigned in different ways. Forget it. The participants and the disagreements and the contributions are accounted for and the achievements of scientific intelligence in dealing with the enigmas of the "Wizard War" are notable enough to reflect credit on all who were involved.

It would be misleading to suggest that Jones' role was only that of a technical intelligence analyst. He was analyst, collector, countermeasure inventor, operator, and policy advocate across the whole range of the technical war. Indeed, he somehow carried the responsibility in MI-6 for scientific intelligence as well as his comparable role on the Air Staff, an arrangement that was the basis of his leadership of scientific intelligence. His role was, in fact, so central to the intelligence effort against German technology that the figure of Jones himself becomes very intriguing. He holds strong views about the process of intelligence analysis and the way it should be organized. To no small degree these derive from his own characteristics and predilections.

Organizationally, he seems to have been remarkably successful in winning acceptance by the leading figures with whom he worked and gaining access to the full range of information and activities related to his intelligence efforts. On a more formal level, the bureaucracy defeated him at every turn. Indeed, his initial appointment to the Air Staff was blocked by the Treasury, which would not authorize his salary of 575 pounds a year. Even Jones' account makes it clear that he must have been a four-star pain-in-the-ass to those who expected reasonable behavior of civil servants. A proper 27-year-old, on being assured of the adequacy of bomber navigation, does not confront leaders of the Bomber Command with a query as to why, if this were true, so many bombers on practice flights flew into hills. Jones was a classic British boffin, a term used to denote scientists working with the Services during the war for which many amusing etymological derivations have been suggested. Perhaps most appropriate here is Watson Watt's description of the boffin as having a bill with two separate functions. "One is to poke into other peoples' business and the other is to puncture the more highly coloured and ornate eggs of the Lesser Back Room Bird which are quite inappropriate to the military scene." Jones was adept at performing both functions.

His apparent concern for personal recognition and intolerance towards those who resisted giving it generates the major flaw in *The Wizard War*. The book is flavored by a preoccupation with "setting the record straight" about personal contributions and the priority of ideas; it comes off as unseemly. It is not that Jones fails to share credit,

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for this he does most magnanimously, and the final section almost washes away the bad taste. He tends to be magnanimous, however, toward those with whom he was not really competing. He seems a prickly fellow with little tolerance for the failing of others. Much of the book has the flavor of the bitter academic rivalries and machinations of C. P. Snow's *The Masters*.

Jones' principal organizational cause is for the central direction of all scientific intelligence (including both analysis and collection) by a person who is genuinely a scientific intelligence officer rather than just a scientist. His bitterest bureaucratic defeat came at the end of the war when, at the recommendation of P. M. S. Blackett, separate scientific and technical intelligence organizations were created in all the services and in MI-6. Jones saw his wartime leadership of all scientific intelligence deteriorate into membership on a committee of 13, with rotating chairmanship, which was to direct the activities of all the organizations involved. Rather than accept such an arrangement he took the Chair of Natural Philosophy at Aberdeen University, where he remains today.

Some of Jones' precepts about intelligence are important. He strongly urges that the final judgments of intelligence be made by technical intelligence officers rather than by scientists serving as consultants. The latter, he argues, are so susceptible to ascribing specific scientific failures to physical impossibility (false principles of impotence) that they are unacceptably vulnerable to situations in which they have failed or not tried to achieve an important development but in which the enemy succeeds. In such cases, the intelligence officer must consider the information from all his sources, including the scientific expert, and question them all until he can somehow resolve the incompatibilities that exist. Only he can do that. It is, of course, required that he have the technical competence to take issue with the experts on the scientific substance of the matter.

On the face of it, this is an unassailable argument. In fact, however, the large number of defense scientists with widely differing views available in the United States—a group principally characterized by an ability to overcome technical obstacles intimidating to the normal man—ensure that the “principle of impotence” will not be too easily invoked by any segment of the community. Moreover, technical intelligence analysis rests upon a structure of constraints on the doable that enables the analyst to bound the possibilities of what is occurring with high credibility. In recent times he has suffered from an overabundance of hypothetical attacks on reasonable constraints that has reduced attempts at analysis to shambles. In consequence, it is often the intelligence analyst rather than the scientist who becomes enamored of his constraints and is unwilling to see them fall to more imaginative thinking. The consulting scientist has been particularly valuable in challenging constraints too deeply embedded in our thinking. Nonetheless, this situation does not weaken the argument that it is the technical intelligence analyst who, in the end, must make the final judgment on the basis of all the information at hand.

Jones argues for small organizations and the close participation of the director of scientific intelligence in the analysis. In such circumstances, the individual can make the organizational integration we so painfully pursue among large numbers of analysts. Splendid! But for the United States, at least, the staggering workload generated by the range of problems with a significant technical ingredient, the lack of sharp focus provided by the exigencies of war, and the need to deal with problems that run from tomorrow to 20 years hence all limit the efficacy of such advice. No doubt the quality of finished intelligence would be higher if it were produced by a small group of men of the caliber of Jones and his associates. No doubt either that the satisfactions in being

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part of such a group would be higher than to be a part of our present intelligence factory, but it simply is not to be.

The point is well made that intelligence is not an end in itself but has value only to the extent that it succeeds in generating proper responsive action. Much of *The Wizard War* is taken up with Jones' efforts to this end. All in all, he was remarkably successful. Success only comes, of course, with a reputation for credibility based on accurate and timely reporting. He achieved credibility through his work on Knickebein and his remarkable success in combining his knowledge of the later navigational beam systems with Enigma decryptions to anticipate the targets of German night bombing raids. He apparently had some trouble with timeliness, however. His consumers repeatedly objected that he was loathe to provide any information until he knew all the facts involved. We all know the frustrations of having to report on the basis of inadequate information, and some readers will know as well the frustrations of needing intelligence but not getting it because of the unwillingness of intelligence analysts to go beyond the limits of the hard information at hand. Jones' guidance on this matter is straightforward: "It is not good enough to bark at the slightest approach of danger; you must first learn enough about that danger to be able to tell your operational staff what it is so that they can take definite action." He attributes intelligence errors in dealing with the German rocket program to premature reporting. Moreover, such demands for regularized reporting only constitute distractions that slow the process of analysis. "With every bleat, the sheep loses a bite." How responsive a chord that strikes! But, alas, alerting the policy makers to upsetting possibilities, even if vaguely defined, is a chore we cannot evade.

It is also interesting to ask how Jones and his handful of co-workers were able to accomplish so much. Are there lessons to be learned from their experience? The answer, I think, is yes. Jones himself was a remarkably able man and a first-rank scientist. His credentials in the latter regard were never in question; he took his doctorate at Oxford at the tender age of 22 when he was awarded a Senior Studentship in Astronomy at Balliol with the promise of subsequent fellowships especially tailored to match his interests and talents. Before entering full-time government service at the age of 25, he had done seminal work in the development of infrared systems for detecting aircraft, which for a short period competed with the development of radar. This experience and stature were important to the leadership he provided.

More important, however, was his interest in and consciousness of the processes of analysis and scientific research. His commentary on the ingredients of analysis and their relative contributions is the most satisfying of Jones' writing for me, and I recommend it to all intelligence analysts. He deals explicitly with the ways in which data must be used, hypotheses developed and tested, and with the ways in which biases of all sorts are apt to affect results. Most intriguing are his discussions of the need for Occam's Razor, accuracy and significant precision in the use of data, the effects of "principles of impotence" on intelligence analysis, and the significance of irony in analytical and scientific results. There is little doubt that this "sense" of analysis importantly affected his work and its credibility.

Jones is an accomplished practical joker. The essence of this art is the ability to anticipate the response of others as they are to be manipulated into some ludicrous situation. *The Wizard War* is full of his triumphs in this questionable sport. There were occasions, however, when his skills were of tremendous value in anticipating German reactions to new challenges, particularly as countermeasures to each new technological ploy were introduced. It played a role, too, in the formulation of deception schemes. At one point Jones directly participated, and obviously with great

relish, in the interjection of misleading information into the communications between German night-fighter pilots and their ground controllers—a practical joker's dream.

The technical intelligence establishment would benefit from paying attention to Jones' use of clandestine reporting, the respect he gives it, and the very high regard he shows the sources who produce it. At a time when the newspapers are full of lunatic reporting about the replacement of clandestine intelligence operations with technical collectors, it is appropriate to note that this definitive work on the origins of scientific intelligence is opened with a Foreword not by a scientist, an Air Marshal, or even by a computer, but by "Amniatrix," the code name for a French agent (now Vicomtesse de Clarens) who gave 10 months warning of the V-bombardment of London. Such fitting and proper tributes to the many sources who contribute to technical intelligence analysis abound in this book, and we all would do well to emulate them in whatever way we can.

Despite its extraordinary demands, intelligence in wartime has some advantages. Priorities are fairly clear. One is not apt to have the vapors because he or she is not told precisely what to do. And the measures of success are unambiguous and harsh. Misestimates very quickly come to light and errors cannot be supported for long. Read Jones on the Coventry raid, for example. Think how satisfying it would be to be able to state with assurance to Congress or OMB or even RMS that, as a result of the work accomplished during the past year, on 1 day in 3 we are able to inform the fighter command of the exact place of that night's German bomber attack, the time of the first bomb within 10 minutes or so, the expected ground speed of the bomber, their line of approach to within 100 yards, and their height to within 2 to 3 hundred meters. Comparable achievements in the post-war period may never be so heralded because real confirmation is never possible before a new system replaces the old.

Having finished the book, one must wonder how R. V. Jones has really fared since his wartime experiences. When, in response to a sense of duty inculcated in his childhood and youth, he abandoned his fellowship in astronomy in favor of working on the IR detection of aircraft, he burned some important academic bridges. He was quick, therefore, to grasp an appointment to a chair at Aberdeen when it was offered after the war. Other than a brief return to the intelligence establishment at Churchill's request in 1952, he remained at this second-rank (though I am assured a *good* second-rank) university. He has worked primarily in the field of instrumentation, for which he has been honored and was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1965. His scientific career has been respectable but not outstanding—less so than might have been expected from his early promise. The bureaucrats seem to have triumphed; unlike nearly all the other boffins of note, he has not been knighted for his wartime contributions.

The problem is, of course, that he got hooked on intelligence and has never quite escaped the exhilaration, the crucial personal involvement in matters of highest importance, and the sense of contribution that marked his wartime experiences. He has characterized the Knickebein investigation as the high point in his professional life, a fact reflected in all his writings. He just can't shake off his exposure to intelligence. As one who joined the CIA with the thought that it should be an intriguing experience for a couple of years and left more than 21 years later in a state of trauma, I can understand.

It is perhaps a final tragedy that his writings, his claims, his unseemly readiness to talk about intelligence, have burned his bridges to the British intelligence community as well. That establishment seems to view him now, as others had in the past, as something of a pain-in-the-ass.

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As for me, I say, Up With Reggie Jones! He is the closest thing the technical intelligence analyst has to a patron saint and we need one now. He has set us a splendid example and been a literate and moving spokesman for our craft. Clutch *The Wizard War* to your bosom and pay tribute to the men and women in British Scientific Intelligence and to its founder, R. V. Jones.

Sayre Stevens

Intelligence Vignette

CODES AND CIPHERS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)

The use of codes and ciphers was not a new experience for the managers of American intelligence during the Revolutionary War, since frequent interception of the mails by both sides had made it a common practice even in personal correspondence. John Jay, the future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who served as chief of counterintelligence, devised a code which used a dictionary as a code book, and a simple substitution chart for names and words not in the dictionary. Robert Morris, who was a member of both the Committee of Secret Correspondence (foreign intelligence) and the Secret Committee (covert procurement) of the Continental Congress, devised a cipher for communication with George Washington. An example of the combining of codes and ciphers is found in a message from "722" (Abraham Woodhull or "Culper, Sr.") to "711" (George Washington): Dqpeu Beyoepu (Jonas Hawkins) agreeable to 28 (recruitment) . . ." James Lovell, a member of the Continental Congress who had been arrested and imprisoned by the British as a spy following the Battle of Bunker Hill, served as the cryptographer for communications between the Committee of Secret Correspondence and its secret agents abroad. (Although many of these agent codes were broken, the one by Charles Dumas at the Hague was pronounced unbreakable by the British, who intercepted some of his despatches.) Perhaps the difficulty of the unfamiliar in dealing with codes and ciphers is best expressed by the Marquis de Lafayette in a postscript to a message to the Comte d'Estaing: ". . . I beg you to excuse the awkwardness and the bad construction of my ciphers; I am very new at this business, and I fear I have made them as unintelligible to you as they would be to Mylord Howe . . ."

THE THIRD WORLD WAR: AUGUST 1985, by *General Sir John Hackett and others*, Macmillan, New York and London, 1979. 326 pages with appendixes.

Editor's Note: Studies in Intelligence normally does not review works of fiction. We are departing from the norm to consider a book written about the future which differs only in style from the war game scenarios and crisis models routinely produced by general staffs and politico-military think tanks. For the intelligence analyst and collector it presents a framework in which a variety of considerations and assumptions about the Soviets, the NATO alliance, and the intelligence community's own capabilities can be tested.

General Sir John Hackett's *The Third World War* was published in England in June 1978 and was first commented on in this country by Drew Middleton in the *New York Times* a month later. In a telephone interview with Middleton, Hackett expressed the hope that the book would stimulate, in Britain and in the West generally, a greater awareness of the grave implications of current military spending trends. Hackett believes the European dependence on the American nuclear umbrella has led to weaknesses in conventional defense capabilities which open the way for a rapid escalation of any major conflict into a full nuclear exchange. Since its initial publication the book has sold very well in the U.K. and was taken seriously enough within Britain's top policy-making circles that Prime Minister Callaghan presented President Carter with a copy at the Guadeloupe summit.

Hackett is a retired Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine who wrote TTWW with the collaboration of several other distinguished military officers, both British and American. The book can be dismissed (as *Time* magazine chose to) as an apologia for the military-industrial complex. Certainly, in the hands of advocates of vastly increased defense spending, it can be a powerful and thought-provoking piece of propaganda. For Kremlinologists the book also lays out a fascinating scenario stressing both the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union and the internal contradictions within the "Soviet empire" which eventually bring it down. For the technologically minded the book places heavy stress upon our vital superiority over the Warsaw Pact in terms of science and technology. For the geopolitician the book carries a sobering forecast of what the next decade may look like in terms of patchy economic progress and widespread political instability. Interestingly enough, Hackett and his colleagues see economic competition developing increasingly along North/South rather than East/West lines.

While there is little explicit reference to intelligence in the book, the entire scenario is loaded with vital implications for all aspects of the intelligence process—collection, collation, analysis, early warning, and long-range forecasting.

Basically, Hackett's scenario is as follows: President Carter is finishing his second term and the subsequent Democratic candidate is Vice President Mondale. In the 1984 election Mondale is defeated by Governor Thompson, a fictitious southern Republican governor.

The Soviets, feeling that various tides are running against them, particularly in Eastern Europe, decide to test the incoming President in the period between the election and the inauguration. Consequently, an Iranian oil tanker and a U.S.

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intelligence ship are sunk by Soviet submarines in November 1984. A summit meeting between U.S. and Soviet leaders is set up and is inconclusive. Looking at a series of options prepared by a "Soviet Kissinger," the Soviets decide to encourage a concerted attack on the Union of South Africa by a variety of black Africans, to move militarily into a post-Tito Yugoslavia which is showing signs of dangerous instability, and to stir up a certain amount of trouble in the Indian subcontinent. The United States unexpectedly (in Soviet eyes) responds to the thrust in Yugoslavia by sending in the Marines, whose heavy punishment of the Soviet forces is graphically displayed to all the world by ubiquitous television cameras. The Soviets then decide to attack NATO through Germany, planning a drive to the Rhine at which point a call for a cease-fire and political negotiations would be issued.

NATO is aware of the growing possibility of a Warsaw Pact attack and when it comes, in August 1985, most preparations have been made. The attack is non-nuclear, but includes Soviet use of chemical warfare which provokes a NATO response in kind. The Soviets stress the use of massed armor, and the descriptions of modern tank warfare are vividly rendered. Although numerically outnumbered and forced to fall back, the NATO forces are able to inflict heavy casualties on the Soviet forces, thanks in large part to technical superiority and a greater flexibility in the NATO command structure. France decides to fight as part of NATO, to the surprise of the Soviets.

The U.S. commander in Europe almost immediately receives requests from his embattled tactical commanders for permission to use nuclear weapons. He resists these entreaties, but eventually bucks them upward to the U.S. President, who rules against the nuclear option. Crucial to NATO's ability to take the initiative is the progress of a convoy across the Atlantic carrying vital reserve troops and additional armor. Eventually three-fourths of the convoy make it to French ports, despite attacks by Soviet torpedoes, missiles, and aircraft. With these reserves in hand, NATO launches a counterattack.

The Soviets, their initial thrust halted near the Rhine and forced back by the NATO attack, decide to launch a single nuclear strike designed to cow NATO forces. The English city of Birmingham is selected and the destruction of that city by a single nuclear blast is described in stark terms. NATO immediately responds in kind and a British and an American submarine each launch missiles aimed at Minsk, which is totally destroyed.

At this point internal strains within the Warsaw Pact are surfacing rapidly. Some Polish units allow themselves to be overrun and captured by NATO forces. It quickly becomes clear that the East European satellites do not wish to be incinerated in a nuclear war fought for Soviet goals which they neither share nor support. A coup within the Soviet Union then takes place, the Russian army begins to withdraw to its traditional borders, and the fighting stops. The book ends with a fascinating but still sobering look at the rest of the world—even in the wake of this holocaust peace is by no means permanently assured.

The basic thesis of the book is that NATO and the West survive—barely—because of measures undertaken in the early 1980s. Washington reinstates the draft and has reserve troops at an acceptable level of training. The British upgrade their air defense to the point that the island remains "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" from which effective air support is given to the American ship convoys. Perhaps most vitally, the West has maintained its technological superiority in newly designed weapons which prove to be crucial in stopping the numerically superior Warsaw forces.

Hackett makes this statement about the current balance of forces in Europe: "Invasion from a standing start in the late seventies, if it had ever been tried, would most certainly have brought the Russians to the Rhine within a few days—unless NATO employed nuclear weapons." It is the bleak implications of that belief which caused Hackett to write what he calls "a cautionary tale."

While one may disagree in any number of ways with the particular scenario which Hackett lays out, his book represents as sophisticated a look at upcoming peace or war issues as we are likely to see outside of a formally constructed war games scenario. Furthermore, the book is solidly rooted in fact—NATO's current state of readiness, the U.S. position with regard to troop reserves, Warsaw Pact arms and doctrine, and the deplorable status of Britain's air defense. Thus, while Hackett's specific scenario is not likely to occur, it is plausible and sobering enough to stimulate a variety of questions, many of which the intelligence community will be asked to deal with over the next several years. A few of the questions which immediately come to mind are:

- Is there a real prospect for an increase in political unrest in Eastern Europe? If so, how will the Soviets react?
- How clearly are the Soviets able to grasp implications of social and economic dislocations throughout the world and to consciously use such events to try to embarrass the United States?*
- How will Western dependence on Middle East oil impact on our ability to fight a non-nuclear war distinguished—*inter alia*—by the incredible rate at which resources are consumed?
- How likely are the French to fight if NATO is attacked in Germany and the Soviets make it clear to Paris that they do not intend to attack France in any way?
- What would China do if the Soviets attacked NATO?
- Is the current pattern of Soviet defense spending, when compared to that of the West, likely to bring a situation in the mid-eighties where the Soviets could feel confident that they would win a non-nuclear war?
- Is the demise of Tito likely to cause such instability as to invite a Soviet military intervention?
- Are the Soviets likely to be the first to use chemical and biological warfare in a war with NATO?
- With what degree of enthusiasm would non-Soviet elements of the Warsaw Pact take part in an attack on NATO?
- How much warning of a Warsaw Pact attack would NATO forces be likely to receive?

The list of questions could be much longer than this; all are being dealt with to a greater or lesser extent at the present time. They will be argued with more vigor and

* See in this connection the "Ryabukhin report" (p. 62) written by a fictional Soviet described by Hackett as "a Harvard-educated muscovite sometimes known in the West as the best backroom Kissinger the Russians had."

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more point over the next 5 years, whether one chooses to accept General Hackett's thesis or to dismiss him as a conservative alarmist. The book ought to be read, and read seriously, because it brings such questions vividly to life as it spins out in plausible and sobering fashion one version of what the next 6 years might bring.

For readers in the intelligence community, the book invites the immediate question of how well qualified the community is today to deal with the deeply disturbing questions flowing from Hackett's narrative.

Donald P. Gregg

Intelligence Vignette

NO "BAY OF PIGS" FOR PRESIDENT PIERCE

(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)

Although at the time of his inaugural President Franklin Pierce hoped—like many Americans—that the Cuban people would revolt and, like Texas, seek admission to the Union as a state, political reality dictated otherwise. Acquisition of Cuba from Spain, he decided, must be by peaceable means, if at all.

One problem facing Pierce was a filibustering expedition against Cuba by his old wartime colleague, Brigadier General John Anthony Quitman. Quitman, working with a Cuban junta, sought to "free Cuba." Pierce opted to disclose intelligence to Quitman in an effort to discourage the move.

Roy Franklin Nichols, Pierce's biographer, describes what happened:

"Pierce knew that Quitman was again preparing to invade Cuba. Despite popular clamor, this must not be. Quitman was called to Washington and showed the plans of the Cuban fortifications. The general then realized that he could not hope to succeed and quit."

PIERCING THE REICH, by *Joseph A. Persico*, Viking Press, New York, 1979. 376 pages.

It has been said that General Donovan's organizational design for OSS was to hire as many people of diverse experience and competence as he could find, scatter them generously around the world, and expect gratifying results. On the whole his confidence was justified.

This is the story of the efforts of OSS to penetrate Germany for intelligence purposes during the Second World War. Or rather it is three stories—or possibly four. First it is the story of the successful enlistment by Allen Dulles' mission in Bern of a number of anti-Nazis of German or Austrian nationality, who volunteered their services to procure information of intelligence or political interest inside Germany. Second it is the story of a small group of energetic, resourceful young Americans who developed a dynamic and somewhat ruthless program to infiltrate an assortment of German POWs, Poles, Belgians and a few uniformed members of the armed forces of the United States into the Greater Reich for what were essentially tactical intelligence purposes. Thirdly it describes the development of arrangements in OSS to utilize the intelligence potential of various labor organizations. Finally it contains a vivid and essentially accurate account of how support facilities were created to forge documents, invent cover stories complete with plausible confirmatory "legends" and evidentiary material, and also of relations between OSS and other branches of service, particularly the Army Air Forces.

Although the book contains a number of minor inaccuracies* it obviously results from a comprehensive review of documentary material made available from OSS archives and also an impressive number of personal interviews. The author has a flair for dramatic writing. The exploits, achievements, sufferings, interrogations and ultimate fortunes of participants in one episode of espionage or another come through in graphic and sometimes chilling detail. These operational descriptions all have a genuine ring of authenticity. It all happened and pretty much happened the way the author says it happened.

He also deals skillfully and on the whole successfully with the problem which confronts anybody who tries to describe in sequence a number of activities which occur simultaneously and continue over a protracted period of time. Inevitably several threads are left hanging while new ones unravel. Lt. Commander John Hedrick Taylor vanishes into the hands of Gestapo agents charged with executing captured Allied officers on page 140. He reemerges in Mauthausen concentration camp on page 276, presenting the reader with some initial difficulty in remembering what he had done to get there. However, the author contrives to maintain the momentum of the over-all story with a minimum of confusion.

The introductory chapter which sets the stage for the OSS effort against Germany contains a necessarily oversimplified and in certain respects misleading account of how OSS had functioned in Europe before the liberation of France. Obviously a few

*Russel Forgan took over command of OSS in the European Theater towards the end of 1944 from David Bruce who was therefore not in charge of operations against Germany during the period covered by the book as is alleged. Whitney Shepardson was in charge of Secret Intelligence (SI) in Washington, not London. Paul Mellon served in Special Operations (SO) and not SI, and the reference to him on page 266 is obviously a mistake. Bill Casey did not make a fortune before the war.

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pages are not enough for anything like an historical analysis of the multifarious activities of OSS in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) between Pearl Harbor and the German evacuation of Paris. The book is exclusively concerned with the positive intelligence mission of OSS/ETO. Quite properly it introduces this subject with a brief outline of other functions performed by OSS in this area—support to resistance activities, sabotage, counterintelligence, psychological warfare, black propaganda, etc. On the whole the author does this reasonably well—albeit in a somewhat breathless style. Some of his statements, however, provoke comment.

At one point (page 12) he says "By 1943, Bruce was commanding two thousand spies, saboteurs, propagandists and supporting staff." If the author means, as I understand he does, uniformed and civilian U.S. subordinates, the figure strikes me as way too large for 1943. Succeeding paragraphs are perhaps susceptible to the interpretation that in 1943 occupied France was swarming with OSS agents. There were not really all that many OSS agents in France prior to D-Day; those who were there were mostly part of a joint program of the London Group of the British Special Operations Executive and the SO Branch of OSS.

If it is a mistake to exaggerate the performance of OSS/SO as an independent entity, however, it is equally a mistake unduly to deprecate it. OSS in the resistance and paramilitary field did more than "tag after" SOE in Europe, as Persico states (page 15). The decision to merge available British and American resources with a view to developing the potentialities of resistance in France and Scandinavia was a wise one.* Competitive efforts by the American and British secret service unilaterally to deal separately with various groups and networks, given the fractionated political allegiance of the French underground, would have resulted in chaos and surely been counterproductive. As it was, under joint OSS/SOE direction and, ultimately, the aegis of DeGaulle, French guerrilla and sabotage operations contributed substantially to the success of the Allied assault. And the American part in this success was significant, if not crucial.**

An accurate appraisal of the precise value of any of the activities of OSS in the European Theater is difficult to make. The SO/SOE contribution to winning the war can be judged by the extent of the damage to the German war economy from sabotage or by the number of days German reinforcements were delayed in their movement to join the battle in Normandy. The value of counterintelligence can be judged, in part at least, by the diversion of German forces from Normandy due to the success of the deception plan in which of course German double agents played a part.

* Friction, of course, existed between American and British officers. Persico refers to an OSS "liaison" officer from whom Maurice Buckmaster, head of the SOE F Section, withheld files. Buckmaster was, by nature, suspicious and most unreceptive to the idea that he was supposed to cooperate with Americans. On the other hand there was no such thing as "liaison" with SOE in 1944. The American who wasn't getting what he wanted from Buckmaster must have been a full-fledged member of the integrated SO/SOE staff, or he had no business asking for papers. If so, he had a clear right of appeal to the joint British/American supervisory staff, to which Buckmaster reported, and the British chief of which, Brigadier E. Mockler Ferryman, was totally objective and completely sympathetic to American problems.

**For what interest it may have, during 1944, 524 Americans served in France behind the enemy lines. Of these, 85 were agents and organizers and the balance Jedburghs and members of operational groups. For what significance it may have, 26 DSCs, 38 Silver Stars, and two Navy Crosses were awarded to American citizens serving in an operational capacity with OSS in the European Theater. American aircraft assigned to OSS operations flew 2,717 sorties between 1 January and 1 October 1944. During the winter and spring of 1943-44 the burden of flights into the heavily defended areas of Northern France and the Pas de Calais was carried primarily by American Liberators. In addition, U.S. air forces personnel at the disposal of OSS carried out a substantial number of landing operations behind enemy lines. In the first 9 months of 1944 some 5,000 tons of American-packed equipment were dispatched to the field. During this period American packing stations actually packed twice as many containers for air delivery as their British counterparts.

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Judging the over-all value of information attributable to espionage operations of one kind or another is particularly difficult. It is not unfair to say that the value of the intelligence attributable to some of the operations described in *Piercing the Reich* was at best questionable. In some cases the importance of the targets for some of the teams dropped into Germany and the coverage produced is substantially overblown.

This is not to say that these missions were not justified. Given the paucity of information on conditions in Germany and the almost total surprise achieved by the Germans in their attack in the Ardennes in December 1944 it is easy to understand the avidity with which military consumers clamored for intelligence. It is also impossible not to admire the courage with which these missions were carried out; the determination and endurance of the agents involved in most of them, and the imagination, skill and persistence of those who mounted them. But bombing targets on the already saturated railroads, an interesting report on Hitler's headquarters, information about German morale, or the non-existent national redoubt, or the identity of Gestapo headquarters—this is not the kind of information which, interesting though it may be, is essential to winning a war.

The value of intelligence from OSS Bern is universally acknowledged. At great risk to themselves Allen Dulles' crown jewels—Kolbe, Hans (Tiny) Gisevius and others—provided a stream of illuminating information on the military intentions and deployments and political maneuverings of the German government as well as on internal political and economic conditions and developments. But here again if the test is whether the outcome of the war was vitally affected by this intelligence the answer, problematically, is no.

Clearly the coverage was extremely useful as collateral to confirm the accuracy of information obtained through Comint (ULTRA). But the greatest potential of Allen Dulles' connections was probably political. They were a source of guidance and channel of approach for possible negotiations looking to the cessation of hostilities—first, prior to July 1944 with the anti-Hitler conspirators and, much later, with officials prepared to surrender the German armies in Italy. Neither of these possibilities was as successful as it might have been—the first for reasons of policy. A conceivably substantial pay-off from the second depreciated as a result of Soviet intransigence, hesitation and delay. None of this was Allen's fault.

The author attributes excessive significance to Bern reporting on German secret weapons. For one thing the air strike against Peenemunde was not, as Persico suggests (p. 56), exactly decisive. According to R. V. Jones, who claims, and deserves, a large share of the credit for orchestrating the intelligence effort against the V-weapon development, the bombing attack on Peenemunde set the German program back some 2 months, which was substantial but not definitive.

The point, however, is that the mosaic of information on German progress with rocket and pilotless aircraft construction was pretty much complete without reporting from Bern, which contributed to the picture but does not appear to have been an essential ingredient. An anonymous report received in Oslo, reports from the Danish underground and foreign workers in Germany, coverage of the communications of the radar units of two companies of the Luftwaffe (identified by a shrewd hunch as tracking the test site), and photographic reconnaissance all were integrated under skillful direction to bring the target into focus.

So the book can perhaps be faulted because it may tend somewhat to inflate the value of intelligence coverage of Germany by OSS during the war. But what a delightful and reassuring fault this is after the spate of dreary "revelations" which feed the current appetite for cynicism. And those who argue that all that was needed

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to win the war was ULTRA and MI-6 would do well to ponder the implications of an American government entirely dependent on a foreign service for its information. The intelligence acquired by OSS Bern and, to some extent, from labor connections provided American policy makers with an independent means of monitoring developments, political and military, inside Germany. The essentially tactical operations involving agents infiltrated by air or through the lines produced some useful information. They also served as an invaluable school of experience in the needs and methods of clandestine activity on which a post-war, hopefully permanent, U.S. intelligence service could build.

Piercing the Reich is a good book which deserves a permanent place in the literature of intelligence and should be read by anyone interested in the origins of the American intelligence service.

John A. Bross

Intelligence Vignette

U.S. MAIL INTERCEPTS DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION

(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)

Throughout the Revolutionary War the Continental Congress regularly received significant quantities of intercepted mail, which it caused to be exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes. With the end of the war, most emergency measures were terminated, but not the postal intercepts. In a secret resolution of September 7, 1785, the Congress authorized the Secretary of the United States for Foreign Affairs, John Jay, to inspect "any letters in any of the post offices" except those to and from members of Congress, when required for the "safety or interest" of the government. The authorization, limited to a 12-month period, was recorded in the *Secret Journals* of Congress, not to be made public until 1820. Granting this authority to Jay, who had been the wartime counterintelligence chief and would be the nation's first Chief Justice, appears to have followed the British practice, then and now, which vests in the Secretary of State the right to authorize mail intercepts.


When the 12-month authorization expired, the Congress renewed it without a time limitation. In the third year of peace, the following resolution was recorded in the *Secret Journals*, not to be "declassified" until 34 years later:

"October 23, 1786: . . . Resolved, unanimously, That whenever it shall appear to the Secretary of the United States of America for the department of foreign affairs that their safety or interest require the inspection of any letters in any of the postoffices, he be authorized and empowered to inspect the said letters, excepting from the operation of the resolution all letters franked by, or addressed to, members of Congress."

Intelligence Vignette

NOW IT CAN BE TOLD

Reproduced below is a clipping from the *Washington Post* of November 9, 1978:



The Editor is persuaded that this clipping at last explains a curious document which has, alas, passed out of his possession but which he is confident he can quote from memory. The document is said to have been found in a battered, stained dispatch case of the Seventh U.S. Cavalry which by roundabout means entered the War Museum of Ludwig I of Bavaria, was bequeathed to Leopold, Second Baron Munchausen, and thence came into the hands of one Private Schweik of the Imperial Austrian Army, who gave it to my great-uncle Miroslav, who gave it to me. The text was scrawled hastily (and nearly indecipherably) on a standard U.S. Army message form and dated June 25, 1876: It read:

TO : Wm. T. Sherman,
General, United States Army, Commanding

FROM : George Armstrong Custer,
Colonel, Seventh U.S. Cavalry, Commanding

SUBJECT : Intelligence Requirement No. 7C-6/25b-76

REFERENCE : FM 76-10

MESSAGE BEGINS : Where is the imagery of the Little Big Horn you promised
me? MESSAGE ENDS.

SECRET
NOFORN

SECRET
NOFORN